Contents
On this page
- The three inputs to a clinical decision and the one typically in dispute
- The evidence–practice gap addressed by the framework
- Formulating an answerable clinical question
- Certainty of evidence and strength of recommendation as distinct judgements
- The boundary between research evidence and patient preference
- An accurate account of the translation lag
- Individual skill and system-level constraints
- Reporting an evidence-informed decision so that it can be audited
- Key points
- Application to your study
- Frequently asked questions
Academy · Research Publication · EBP and informed decisions
How Evidence-Based Practice Supports Informed Clinical Decisions
Evidence-based practice does not prescribe what a clinician should do. It provides a disciplined means of judging how much confidence a recommendation deserves, and of separating the part of a decision that research can settle from the part that only the patient can decide. Most failures attributed to evidence-based practice (EBP) are failures to make that separation.
Sackett and colleagues defined evidence-based medicine in the BMJ in 1996 as the integration of the best available research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values. The definition is three decades old and is still routinely reduced to its first component, which is how EBP acquired its reputation for “cookbook medicine”. The practical value of the framework is narrower, and more useful, than its advocates often claim: it makes the grounds of a decision explicit, so that a colleague, a patient or a reviewer can identify which part of the reasoning rests on trial data, which on local experience and which on the preferences of the individual patient.
Learning objectives
- Separate the three inputs to a clinical decision (research evidence, clinical expertise and patient values) and identify which carries the weight
- Convert a vague clinical uncertainty into an answerable question using a structured format
- Interpret a recommendation’s strength and its underlying certainty as distinct judgements
- Recognise the decisions that EBP cannot adjudicate, and the appropriate alternative approach
- Describe an evidence-informed decision in a manuscript so a reader can audit the reasoning
- State the research-to-practice time lag accurately rather than repeating the popular version
Common misconceptions
- “Evidence-based practice means following the trial data.” It means integrating trial data with clinical expertise and the patient’s values. Sackett and colleagues wrote the 1996 BMJ editorial precisely to reject the reading that evidence alone decides.
- “A strong recommendation means the evidence is strong.” These are separate judgements. The GRADE approach, described by Balshem and colleagues in the Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, rates certainty of evidence independently of recommendation strength, because a strong recommendation can rest on low-certainty evidence when the balance of benefits and harms is lopsided.
- “Expert opinion is what EBP replaced.” Tonelli, writing in Academic Medicine, defends expert opinion as a distinct and necessary form of warrant, which carries the reasoning when evidence is absent, as it is in most cases for most individual patients.
- “Research takes 17 years to reach practice.” Morris, Wooding and Grant reviewed 23 papers that quantified translation time lags and found that the frequently quoted average of 17 years rests on a small number of estimates with incompatible definitions of start and end point. The figure is a frequently repeated assertion rather than a measurement.
- “A clinician who practises EBP thereby ensures that patients receive evidence-based care.” Individual intention is not the binding constraint. Buchan, Sewell and Sweet, writing in the Medical Journal of Australia, report that 30-40% of patients do not receive treatments of proven effectiveness, a systems problem that individual appraisal skill alone cannot resolve.
The three inputs to a clinical decision and the one typically in dispute
The essential step in evidence-based practice is not consulting the literature but identifying which of three inputs is unresolved in a given decision. Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes and Richardson, in the BMJ in 1996, named them: best available external evidence, individual clinical expertise, and the patient’s predicaments, rights and preferences 19. Rosenberg and Donald had set out the problem-solving version a year earlier in the same journal 20.
In most cases, only one of the three is genuinely in doubt. If a trial answers the clinical question in a population resembling the patient, and the patient wants the outcome the trial measured, there is little to deliberate. The decision becomes difficult when the evidence exists but the patient does not resemble the trial population, when the evidence is clear but the patient weights the outcomes differently from the trialists, or when the evidence does not exist. These are three different problems with three different remedies, and treating them as one (“more evidence is needed”) is the most common analytical error in clinical reasoning.
The Sicily statement on evidence-based practice, published by Dawes and colleagues in BMC Medical Education, sets out the five-step process that operationalises this: ask, acquire, appraise, apply, assess 12. The steps merit explicit application at least until they become habitual, because the two that are most often omitted, the first and the last, are the two that determine whether practice changes.
The five steps of evidence-based practice, and what goes wrong at each
| Step | What it requires | The common failure |
|---|---|---|
| Ask | Convert the uncertainty into a question naming population, intervention, comparator and outcome | Skipped. A question with no comparator cannot be searched, so the search returns background reading |
| Acquire | Search sources appropriate to the question type, including sources of unpublished work | Searching one database and treating the yield as the evidence base |
| Appraise | Judge risk of bias, consistency, directness and precision; rate certainty | Reading the abstract’s conclusion and treating statistical significance as effect size |
| Apply | Integrate the appraised evidence with clinical circumstance and patient values | Treating the average effect as the individual prediction, or the guideline as the decision |
| Assess | Evaluate whether the decision produced the intended outcome, and feed that back | Skipped. Without this step the process is advisory rather than self-correcting |
Steps as set out in the Sicily statement on evidence-based practice, Dawes and colleagues, BMC Medical Education. Failure modes compiled from the barriers and implementation literature cited in this article.
The evidence–practice gap addressed by the framework
EBP is sometimes presented as an epistemological improvement, a description that understates its significance. Its origin is an observed and persistent gap between what is known and what is done, documented long before the term existed. Wennberg, in Science in 1973, showed that rates of common procedures varied across small geographic areas by amounts no difference in disease prevalence could explain 27. Chassin and colleagues, in JAMA, examined how coronary angiography was actually used and found that the clinical determinants of appropriateness only partly accounted for it 25. Eddy, in Health Affairs, attributed much of the variation to uncertainty rather than ignorance, with clinicians making different reasonable judgements in the absence of settled knowledge 26.
Where the gap has been quantified, its scale is considerable. Buchan, Sewell and Sweet, in the Medical Journal of Australia, report that 30-40% of patients do not receive treatments of proven effectiveness, and that 20-25% receive treatments that are unnecessary or potentially harmful 13,14. Grol and Wensing, in the same journal, report studies from the United States and the Netherlands suggesting at least 30-40% of patients do not receive care according to current scientific evidence. These figures should be interpreted with care: they are estimates drawn from specific settings and specific condition sets, not a global audit. They are sufficient to establish that the gap is large and two-directional, with underuse and overuse coexisting, but not sufficient to support a precise claim about any particular service.
Estimates of the two-directional care gap, from Buchan H, Sewell JR, Sweet M. Translating evidence into practice. Medical Journal of Australia. Grol R and Wensing M, in the same journal, report studies from the United States and the Netherlands suggesting at least 30-40% of patients do not receive care according to current scientific evidence. These are estimates from specific settings and condition sets, not a global audit.
Formulating an answerable clinical question
The first step is the one most often omitted, and its omission explains why many literature searches return nothing useful. Richardson, Wilson, Nishikawa and Hayward, in ACP Journal Club, set out what a well-built clinical question contains: the patient or problem, the intervention, the comparison, and the outcome that matters 22. The value lies not in the acronym but in the requirement to name the comparator and the outcome, which often reveals that a vague clinical concern contains two separate questions.
A worked example illustrates this. “Should this patient be anticoagulated?” is unanswerable, because it contains no comparator, no time horizon and no specified outcome. Broken down, it comprises at least three questions: what is this patient’s absolute risk of thromboembolism over a defined period; what is the absolute risk reduction from a specified agent against a specified alternative in a population resembling this patient; and how does this patient weigh a stroke avoided against a bleed incurred. The first is a prognostic question, the second a therapeutic one answerable from trial evidence, and the third not a research question at all. The Academy’s page on the PICO framework covers the mechanics, and EBP in assessment and diagnosis covers what changes when the question is diagnostic rather than therapeutic.
Certainty of evidence and strength of recommendation as distinct judgements
This is the most common misreading of a guideline, and it occurs in both directions. Balshem and colleagues, in the Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, describe the GRADE approach to rating certainty of evidence: high, moderate, low or very low, determined by study design and then adjusted for risk of bias, inconsistency, indirectness, imprecision and publication bias 8. That rating expresses confidence in the estimate of effect. It does not indicate whether to act on it.
Recommendation strength is a separate judgement that incorporates the magnitude and balance of benefits and harms, the certainty of the evidence, the variability in patient values, and resource use. Consequently, a strong recommendation can, and often does, rest on low-certainty evidence when the potential harm of inaction is severe and the intervention is inexpensive and safe. The reverse also occurs: high-certainty evidence of a small average benefit may warrant only a conditional recommendation, because patients reasonably differ on whether the benefit justifies the burden.
Bellomo and Bagshaw, in Critical Care, make a related point about hierarchies of evidence: classifying trial evidence by design alone ignores dimensions that matter clinically, such as the plausibility of the biological mechanism and the consistency of effect across settings 10. DeVito and Goldacre, in BMJ Evidence-Based Medicine, explain why none of this can be taken at face value: the published literature is a biased sample of the research conducted, and publication bias inflates apparent effects in a direction that a reader cannot detect from the papers themselves 3.
The boundary between research evidence and patient preference
Research evidence can describe the probability distribution of outcomes under each option. It cannot determine how those outcomes should be traded against each other for an individual. Eddy, in Health Affairs, argued for a unified approach that makes this boundary explicit rather than allowing it to become blurred 11. Tonelli, in Respiratory Care, set out the limits of evidence-based medicine in detail: population-derived estimates underdetermine individual decisions, and the framework has no internal mechanism for weighing a patient’s goals against an average effect size 17,18.
Two practical consequences follow. First, the statement “the evidence supports X” is almost always an overstatement; the accurate form is “the evidence supports X for patients who value outcome A over outcome B”. Second, when a patient declines an evidence-supported option, this is not a failure of evidence-based practice and may represent its correct operation.
A further problem concerns the patient who would not have been eligible for the trial. Serpico and Maziarz, in the European Journal for Philosophy of Science, discuss pragmatic N-of-1 designs as a way of investigating individual treatment response where an averaged effect is not the quantity of interest 2. For stable chronic conditions with rapidly reversible treatments, the single-patient trial is a legitimate and underused source of evidence.
An accurate account of the translation lag
The claim that research takes 17 years to reach practice appears in a very large number of introductions, usually uncited or cited to a source that does not support it. Morris, Wooding and Grant, in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, reviewed 23 papers that attempted to quantify translation time lags and found the frequently stated 17-year average rests on only a handful of estimates. More importantly, the papers disagree fundamentally on what is being timed: the start point varies from basic discovery to first publication to first trial, and the end point from first clinical use to majority adoption to guideline inclusion. Numbers computed on different definitions cannot be averaged.
Authors who wish to make this point in a manuscript should make it qualitatively: the interval between demonstration of effect and routine use is long and poorly characterised, and the published estimates are not comparable. That statement is defensible. The 17-year figure, asserted as fact, is not, and a reviewer familiar with research methods is likely to notice. The Academy’s page on translating research into practice interventions examines in more detail what is known about closing the interval.
Individual skill and system-level constraints
Teaching EBP to clinicians improves their appraisal skills. Whether it changes their practice is a separate and much weaker claim. Ilic and Maloney, in Medical Education, systematically reviewed methods of teaching evidence-based medicine to medical trainees and found the evidence on which approach works best is limited 6. Maggio and colleagues, in Academic Medicine, reviewed EBM training in undergraduate medical education; Meats, Heneghan, Crilly and Glasziou, in Medical Teacher, surveyed what UK medical schools teach. The consistent finding across this literature is that knowledge and skills respond to teaching more readily than behaviour does.
Grol and Grimshaw, in the Lancet, explain the reason: moving from best evidence to best practice requires organisational change, not only individual learning 16. Grol and Wensing, in the Medical Journal of Australia, catalogue the barriers and incentives, most of which operate above the level of the individual clinician. Ivers and colleagues, in the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, show that audit and feedback produces small average improvements in professional practice, with effect size depending heavily on how the feedback is designed and delivered 1. In summary, individual competence is necessary but demonstrably insufficient, and the interventions that are effective at scale are organisational. The Academy’s pages on implementing EBP in healthcare and performance gap assessment cover the systems side.
Reporting an evidence-informed decision so that it can be audited
In a case report, a guideline, a clinical study report or the discussion section of a trial, the reader requires not the conclusion but its grounds. A decision paragraph that can be audited has four components: the question in answerable form, the evidence consulted with its certainty stated, the clinical factors that modified the application of that evidence to this patient or population, and the patient-level or stakeholder-level values that determined the trade-off. If any one is omitted, the reader cannot determine whether they would have reached the same decision.
Mainz, in the International Journal for Quality in Health Care, sets out how clinical indicators should be defined and classified if they are to support quality improvement; this is relevant because the choice of indicator implicitly determines what counts as the correct decision 15. For authors preparing such material for publication, Pubrica’s medical writing and systematic review pages cover the manuscript-level mechanics, and biostatistics support covers stating effect estimates with their uncertainty rather than their point value alone.
A decision paragraph in a manuscript discussion
Asserts the decision was evidence-based
An evidence-based approach was adopted in the management of this patient. Current guidelines and the available literature support anticoagulation in this setting, and treatment was therefore initiated in accordance with best practice. The patient was counselled appropriately and consented to treatment.
“An evidence-based approach was adopted” is unfalsifiable. It names no question, no evidence and no trade-off, so a reader cannot tell what was weighed.
“Current guidelines support” collapses two judgements. Recommendation strength and certainty of evidence are rated separately under GRADE, and the sentence reports neither.
No comparator and no time horizon. Without these, the claimed benefit has no magnitude, and the reader cannot reconstruct the arithmetic.
The patient’s values are reduced to consent. Consent records that the patient agreed; it does not record what the patient was trading off, which is the part of the decision that evidence cannot supply.
“In accordance with best practice” substitutes for an argument. It appeals to authority at exactly the point where the reasoning should be visible.
Shows the grounds, so a reader can disagree specifically
The decision concerned a specific question: in a patient of this age with this arrhythmia and this bleeding-risk profile, what is the absolute reduction in thromboembolic events over twelve months from a direct oral anticoagulant compared with no anticoagulation, and what is the corresponding absolute increase in major bleeding? Trial evidence addressing this comparison is of moderate certainty, downgraded for indirectness because the enrolled populations were younger and had fewer comorbidities than this patient. Two clinical factors modified the application of that evidence here: impaired renal function, which alters the dose and narrows the margin, and a previous fall requiring admission, which is not an exclusion in the trials but changes the bleeding estimate. When the absolute numbers were presented, the patient stated that she weighted avoidance of disabling stroke well above avoidance of a bleed requiring transfusion, and treatment was started on that basis.
The question is in answerable form, so a reader can check whether the cited evidence actually addresses it.
Certainty is stated with the reason for the rating, which lets a reader who disagrees about indirectness say so precisely.
The two clinical modifiers are named, so the gap between the trial population and this patient is explicit rather than assumed away.
The patient’s weighting of outcomes is recorded as a determinant of the decision, not as agreement with a decision already made.
Every element is auditable: another clinician could follow the same reasoning to a different conclusion and show exactly where they diverged.
A reviewer cannot engage critically with the first version because it contains no claim with a truth value. The second invites specific challenge, which is what makes a clinical argument publishable.
Key points
Key points
Evidence-based practice is the integration of appraised research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values, as Sackett and colleagues defined it in the BMJ in 1996, not the substitution of the first input for the other two. Its practical value is that it requires identification of the input actually in dispute, and separation of certainty of evidence from strength of recommendation, as GRADE requires. The care gap it addresses is real and bidirectional: Buchan, Sewell and Sweet report that 30-40% of patients do not receive treatments of proven effectiveness while 20-25% receive care that is unnecessary or potentially harmful. Individual appraisal skill is not, however, the binding constraint: the teaching literature shows that knowledge changes more readily than behaviour, and the interventions that change practice are organisational. When a decision is reported, its grounds should be given rather than a label: the question, the certainty, the clinical modifiers and the values trade-off. The 17-year translation figure should not be repeated as fact; Morris, Wooding and Grant showed that it rests on incompatible definitions across a small number of estimates.
Application to your study
Application to your study
- The disputed input should be identified. Before searching, the clinician should determine whether the uncertainty concerns the evidence, its application to the patient, or the patient’s preferences. Only the first is a problem for the literature.
- The question should be written out with a comparator. A question is not yet searchable unless it states what the intervention is compared against and over what time horizon.
- Certainty of evidence and strength of recommendation should be recorded separately. The GRADE rating and the reason for any downgrading should be noted, and the recommendation and its basis then stated as a second, distinct judgement.
- The gap between the trial population and the patient should be quantified. The ways in which the patient would not have been eligible for enrolment should be listed, together with the effect of each on the estimate.
- The values trade-off should be documented. The record should state which outcome the patient weighted above which, in the patient’s own terms, rather than as a consent formality.
- The translation lag should be described qualitatively. The interval should be described as long and poorly characterised; a figure that the source literature cannot support should not be asserted.
- The loop should be closed. A date and a measurable criterion should be set for assessing whether the decision produced the intended outcome, and the result should be recorded.
Frequently asked questions
It is a method for making clinical decisions that keeps three inputs visible and separate: the best available research evidence, the clinician’s expertise, and the patient’s values. Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes and Richardson defined it in this way in the BMJ in 1996, explicitly to rule out the interpretation that evidence alone decides. In practice it proceeds in five steps, set out in the Sicily statement by Dawes and colleagues: ask an answerable question, acquire the evidence, appraise it, apply it in context, and assess the outcome. Its value lies not in automatically producing better answers but in making the grounds of a decision open to inspection by others.
No; the original definition states the opposite. Clinical expertise is one of the three named inputs, and it carries most of the reasoning where evidence is limited, which is the case in the majority of individual decisions. Tonelli has argued this explicitly, defending expert opinion in Academic Medicine as a distinct form of warrant rather than a lower rung on the same ladder, and setting out the limits of evidence-based medicine in Respiratory Care. The legitimate criticism of experience is narrower: unaided clinical judgement is a poor estimator of effect size and a poor detector of small benefits, which is the purpose of trials. Experience is indispensable for deciding whether a trial result applies to the individual patient.
Because they are two separate judgements. Under the GRADE approach described by Balshem and colleagues in the Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, certainty of evidence reflects confidence in the estimate of effect, while recommendation strength also incorporates the magnitude and balance of benefits and harms, variability in patient values, and resource use. When the potential harm of not acting is severe and the intervention is inexpensive and low-risk, a strong recommendation on low-certainty evidence is the rational output. The reverse also occurs: high-certainty evidence of a small average benefit often warrants only a conditional recommendation, because patients reasonably differ on whether that benefit justifies the burden.
The figure is not supportable as stated. Morris, Wooding and Grant, in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, reviewed 23 papers that attempted to quantify translation time lags and found the commonly quoted 17-year average rests on only a handful of estimates. The more fundamental problem is that the underlying studies do not agree on what is being timed (start points range from basic discovery to first publication to first trial, and end points from first clinical use to guideline inclusion to majority adoption), so the estimates cannot be averaged. The point should instead be stated qualitatively: the interval between demonstrating an effect and using it routinely is long and poorly characterised.
Large in both directions, and less precisely known than the frequently quoted figures imply. Buchan, Sewell and Sweet, in the Medical Journal of Australia, report that 30-40% of patients do not receive treatments of proven effectiveness and that 20-25% receive treatments that are unnecessary or potentially harmful. Grol and Wensing, in the same journal, cite studies from the United States and the Netherlands suggesting at least 30-40% of patients do not receive care consistent with current scientific evidence. These are estimates from particular settings and particular condition sets rather than a global audit; they establish that the gap is substantial and two-directional but do not support a precise claim about any given service.
It reliably improves knowledge and appraisal skill; the effect on behaviour is weaker and less consistent. Ilic and Maloney reviewed teaching methods in Medical Education and found limited evidence on which approach works best; Maggio and colleagues reviewed undergraduate EBM training in Academic Medicine; Meats and colleagues surveyed UK medical school teaching in Medical Teacher. Grol and Grimshaw, in the Lancet, explain the shortfall: moving from best evidence to best practice is an organisational change problem. Ivers and colleagues, in the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, show that audit and feedback yields small average improvements that depend strongly on design. The appropriate conclusion is that individual competence is necessary but not sufficient.
The absence of evidence should be stated explicitly, and reasoning should then proceed from the closest available evidence with the extrapolation identified. The clinician should state which population the evidence came from, how the patient differs, and in which direction each difference is likely to move the effect. Expert opinion is a legitimate warrant in this situation rather than a weakness, as Tonelli argues. For stable chronic conditions with rapidly reversible treatments, the feasibility of a single-patient trial should be considered: Serpico and Maziarz discuss pragmatic N-of-1 designs as a way of investigating individual treatment response where an average effect is not the quantity of interest. The absence of evidence should not be presented as if it were evidence of no effect.
The grounds should be given rather than a label. A decision paragraph that a reader can audit contains four elements: the question in answerable form with a comparator and a time horizon; the evidence consulted with its certainty stated and any downgrade explained; the clinical factors that modified how that evidence applied to this patient or population; and the values trade-off that determined the balance. Phrases such as “an evidence-based approach was adopted” or “in accordance with best practice” have no truth value, and a reviewer will regard them as a gap. The test is whether another clinician could follow the reasoning to a different conclusion and identify exactly where the two diverged.
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Every source above is a peer-reviewed article, a publisher’s record of one, or a standard issued by the body that owns it. Each carries the date it was last read. Where a standard moves, this article is revised rather than left up with a note.
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Pubrica Academy. “How Evidence-Based Practice Supports Informed Clinical Decisions.” Pubrica. October 9, 2026. https://pubrica.com/academy/latest-topics/how-ebp-enable-healthcare-professionals-to-provide-informed-decision/
Pubrica Academy, ‘How Evidence-Based Practice Supports Informed Clinical Decisions’ (Pubrica, 9 October 2026) <https://pubrica.com/academy/latest-topics/how-ebp-enable-healthcare-professionals-to-provide-informed-decision/> accessed 15 October 2026.
Pubrica Academy. How Evidence-Based Practice Supports Informed Clinical Decisions. [Internet]. Pubrica; 2026 Oct 9 [cited 2026 Oct 15]. Available from: https://pubrica.com/academy/latest-topics/how-ebp-enable-healthcare-professionals-to-provide-informed-decision/
Pubrica Academy, “How Evidence-Based Practice Supports Informed Clinical Decisions,” Pubrica, Oct. 9, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://pubrica.com/academy/latest-topics/how-ebp-enable-healthcare-professionals-to-provide-informed-decision/
@misc{how_ebp_enable_healthcare_professional_2026,
author = {{Pubrica Academy}},
title = {How Evidence-Based Practice Supports Informed Clinical Decisions},
howpublished = {Pubrica},
year = {2026},
month = {oct},
url = {https://pubrica.com/academy/latest-topics/how-ebp-enable-healthcare-professionals-to-provide-informed-decision/},
note = {Accessed: <span data-cite-acc="iso">2026-10-15</span>}
}This article is written to be learned from. Cite it if you are referring to what it says; if you are using the evidence behind it, cite the sources listed above instead.
Decision record: four grounds for an evidence-informed choice
This record should be completed before the decision is written up, whether for a case report, a guideline, a clinical study report or a discussion section. Any empty block identifies the part of the reasoning that a reviewer is likely to challenge.
EVIDENCE-INFORMED DECISION RECORD
1. THE QUESTION (must contain a comparator and a horizon)
Population / patient ...........: ______________________
Intervention ...................: ______________________
Comparator .....................: ______________________
Outcome that matters ...........: ______________________
Time horizon ...................: ______________________
Question type: [ ] therapy [ ] diagnosis [ ] prognosis
[ ] harm [ ] patient values (not a literature question)
2. THE EVIDENCE
Sources searched ...............: ______________________
Date of search .................: ______________________
Best available study design ....: ______________________
Absolute effect, with interval ..: ______________________
Certainty rating ...............: [ ] high [ ] moderate [ ] low [ ] very low
Reason for any downgrade ........: ______________________
[ ] risk of bias [ ] inconsistency [ ] indirectness
[ ] imprecision [ ] publication bias
Recommendation strength (SEPARATE judgement): ____________
Basis for that strength .........: ______________________
3. CLINICAL MODIFIERS (how this case differs from the evidence base)
Ways this patient would not have been enrolled:
a. ____________________ direction of effect on estimate: ______
b. ____________________ direction of effect on estimate: ______
c. ____________________ direction of effect on estimate: ______
Local factors (availability, monitoring, skill): ____________
4. VALUES AND TRADE-OFF
Outcomes presented to the patient, in absolute terms: ______
Outcome the patient weighted HIGHEST: ______________________
Outcome the patient was willing to risk: __________________
Decision reached ...............: ______________________
Who made it ....................: ______________________
5. ASSESS (the step that is always skipped)
Measurable criterion for success: ______________________
Review date ....................: ______________________
What actually happened .........: ______________________
PHRASES TO DELETE IF PRESENT
[ ] "an evidence-based approach was adopted"
[ ] "in accordance with best practice"
[ ] "the literature supports" with no effect size
[ ] "research takes 17 years to reach practice"
[ ] "the patient was counselled appropriately" as the only record of values Pubrica AcademyWritten and maintained by Pubrica’s subject matter experts. Articles are revised when the underlying standards change, and each article states the date on which it was last reviewed.
How Pubrica can help
Pubrica’s clinical and editorial teams work on the written record: they check that the decision paragraph in a case report, guideline or study report names a comparator, states certainty separately from strength of recommendation, and records the values trade-off rather than the consent. Where a claim in a draft lacks a supporting source, Pubrica identifies it and proposes a qualitative formulation; the 17-year translation figure is the claim most frequently removed.